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Abstract 
All normative leadership theories suggest that disciplining followers that transgress moral norms 
is a crucial leadership task. However, leaders sometimes yet fail to do so. Previous research has 
indicated that leaders may refrain from enacting discipline out of self-interest or from concern for 
the organization’s interest. We explore another option: leaders may simply be unwilling to 
enforce moral norms because of a negative attitude towards them. We argue and show that 
leaders that construe norms on relatively low (i.e. concrete) levels are likely to see norms as 
annoying obstacles, whereas leaders that construe moral norms on high (i.e. abstract) levels will 
have a more positive view of norms. In line with this, high construal level leaders are likely to be 
willing to enforce moral norms through discipline in response to follower moral transgressions. 
Low construal level leaders, in contrast, actively avoid doing so. We show this effect in different 
contexts and for different types of leader discipline.  
Keywords: leader disciplinary behavior, leader cognition, construal level theory, 
intentionality. 
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Getting it Done and Getting it Right: Leader Disciplinary Reactions to Followers’ Moral 
Transgressions are Determined by Leader’s Construal Level Mindset 
During the Italy vs Uruguay match at the 2014 football world cup in Brazil, Uruguayan 
star striker Luis Suárez bit his opponent, the Italian defender Giorgo Chiellini, in the shoulder 
(BBC.co.uk, June 25, 2014). Asked about the event a few hours later, the Uruguayan manager 
Óscar Tabárez commented “this is a football world cup, not about morality” (Borden, June 24, 
2014). Tellingly, Tabárez refrained from disciplining his pupil, and even went as far as resigning 
from his position within FIFA (football’s governing body) over a ban issued as a result of the 
incidence (Sky Sports, June 28, 2014). Underlying Tabárez’s reaction is an apparent 
unwillingness to enforce moral norms in response to this incident. This example shows us that 
leaders may sometimes go as far as to actively avoid disciplining a follower when that follower 
transgresses a moral norm. Why does this happen? The answer, we suggest, is found in how 
leaders understand, or ‘construe’, moral norms. 
Moral norms can be construed in one of two ways (Beauchamp, 2003): some people may 
perceive a moral norms as a guideline for appropriate behavior in a situation, but for others, it can 
be nothing more an annoying restriction on their freedom of choice (Adorno, 2000). This has 
obvious consequences for leader disciplinary behavior: a leader who finds moral norms to be 
annoying obstacles is less likely to be willing to enforce them by enacting discipline. In contrast, 
a leader who sees moral norms as positive guidelines is more likely to be willing to do so. 
Encouraging moral follower behavior is a crucial leadership task (Ciulla, 2004). It is therefore 
important to understand what factors determine whether leaders enforce moral norms or not. 
Basing ourselves on construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010) we argue that low (i.e., 
concrete) construal is associated with an adverse attitude towards moral norms, whereas high 
(i.e., abstract) construal is associated with a positive view (Hunt, Kim, Borgida, & Chaiken, 
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2010). This has the result that low construal level leaders actively avoid enacting discipline in 
response to follower moral transgressions, whereas high construal level makes leaders actually 
want to enact discipline in response to such transgressions.  
Focusing on a cognitive phenomenon like leader construal level in this way helps opening 
the ‘black box’ of leader cognition and its relation to an important leader behavior: leader 
discipline (Avolio, Walumbwa, & Weber, 2009). There are obvious normative and theoretical 
consequences that follow from our argument. First, stimulating moral follower behavior has been 
argued to be at the very heart of ‘good’ leadership (Ciulla, 2014). Our framework helps to 
understand why leaders may yet avoid doing so. Second, failing to enact discipline when it is 
needed has been shown to have negative influences on followers’ sense of justice and their 
support for the leader (Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010). Avoiding to enact sufficient discipline in the 
wake of follower misbehavior may therefore undermine a leader’s effectiveness also in other 
domains. Finally, leaders’ failure to act in line with moral obligations has been argued to result 
from the influence of leader self-interest (e.g., Cramwinckel, De Cremer, & van Dijke, 2013; 
Maner & Mead, 2010), or from concerns about the organization’s interest (Sims & Brinkmann, 
2003). We argue, however, that even if the leader or the organization do not profit from a 
follower’s moral transgression, the leader may still avoid enacting disciplinary responses in 
situations where he or she is, in fact, morally obliged to do so. 
Theoretical background 
The moral obligations of leadership 
It is increasingly recognized that the job of organizational leaders involves much more than 
motivating followers towards optimal performance and safeguarding the bottom line (Rizzo, 
House, & Lirtzman, 1970). Leaders also have moral obligations, such as setting the right example 
and treating followers in a fair and just manner (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Van Houwelingen, Van 
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Dijke, & De Cremer, 2014). These moral obligations follow from a normative perspective on 
leadership (Gini, 1997), but they also have pragmatic justification. Ethical leadership has been 
shown to be associated with desirable follower outcomes, such as extra-role behaviors and 
employee satisfaction (Avey, Palanski, & Walumbwa, 2011; Toor & Ofori, 2009). However, 
little is known about how leaders themselves view moral norms and obligations. 
 Broadly, a moral norm can be viewed in two ways (Adorno, 2000). On the one hand, 
moral principles allow us to tell ‘right’ from ‘wrong’, they may inspire us to behave in morally 
accorded ways, and they may be seen to provide the fabric of social life (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). 
In other words, moral obligations and norms can be seen as positive guidelines, inspiring us to be 
best version of ourselves (or aspire to be). At the same time, people may have a decidedly more 
negative attitude towards moral norms (Beauchamp, 2003; Leiter, 2014): moral norms restrict 
freedom and may be impediments to reaching certain aims. Indeed, if a moral norm did not rule 
out certain types of behavior as immoral, it would hardly be able to function as a moral norm in 
the first place. Understanding moral norms as positive guidelines or as annoying obstacles 
understandably has substantial influence on the willingness to enforce them. 
 Leaders are people too. However, the moral obligations of leaders extend beyond those of 
regular employees (Sims & Brinkman, 2002): leaders are responsible for inspiring followers to 
behave in morally appropriate ways (Ciulla, 2014). One of the ways of doing so is by enacting 
discipline in response to follower moral misbehavior (Brown & Treviño, 2006). Disciplining 
morally transgressing followers is clearly morally mandated (Gini, 1997), but – at the same time 
– it has been shown that leaders experience it as unpleasant and time-consuming (Treviño, 1992). 
When leaders view moral norms and obligations as positive guidelines for behavior, they will be 
motivated to enact discipline when a follower transgresses a moral norm; they are, after all, 
morally obligated to do so. However, when leaders view moral norms as annoying obstacles, they 
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are much less likely to be willing to enforce them by enacting discipline. Rather, they are likely 
to actively avoid enforcing moral norms. 
 In sum, how a leader enacts discipline in response to morally misbehaving followers 
depends on how they view and understand, or ‘construe’ moral norms and obligations. According 
to construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), there are fundamentally two levels at which 
people construe information: low (i.e., concrete) and high (i.e., abstract). This phenomenon is 
directly relevant to our problem at hand as low construal implies an adverse attitude of moral 
norms and obligations, and high construal a positive one. 
Construal level and leader discipline 
Construal level is a fundamental cognitive phenomenon and refers to the level of 
abstraction by which we mentally represent objects, situations, or people (Burgoon, Henderson, 
& Markman, 2013). High construal level is an abstract way of representing information. Objects, 
situations or people construed at a high levels are therefore represented by relatively little, 
schematic and ‘gist-like’ pieces of information (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Low construal level is 
the opposite of that. Objects, situations or people construed at low construal levels are 
represented by way of concrete, detailed, and peripheral information (Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
Low construal levels typically involve a stronger focus on the ‘here’ and the ‘now’ as much 
detailed information is relatively fleeting (Liberman & Trope, 2008). 
 There is some controversy about how construal level affects moral judgments (see e.g., 
Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008 vs. Gong & Medin, 2012). However, research shows that high 
construal level facilitates the influence of moral principles on behavior, whereas low construal 
level impedes this influence (see e.g., Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009; Hunt 
et al., 2010). This is related to a phenomenon called ‘construal level fit’ (Lee, Keller, & Sternthal, 
2010): people have a preference for information that fits their mindset – abstract information is 
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seen as more positive when people are in high construal level mindsets, and concrete information 
is perceived to be more positive when people are in low construal level mindsets (Berson, 
Halevy, Shamir, and Erez, 2014). Moral principles tend to be relatively abstract: they provide 
information on what should be done in general, irrespective of specific situations (e.g., the golden 
rule, the categorical imperative; Hirst, 1934). Because of this, they have a stronger influence 
when people are in high construal level mindsets. In line with this, Ledgerwood and Callahan 
(2012) show that high construal level is associated with stronger norm compliance.  
 While research has provided evidence on the way that high construal level affects the 
influence of moral principles, much less research has been devoted to the influence of low 
construal level (Eyal & Liberman, 2010). Yet, we can deduce from the research referred to above 
that low construal level impedes the influence of moral principles – the abstractness of moral 
principles does not ‘fit’ low construal level (Eyal et al., 2008; Hunt et al., 2010). We argue that 
low construal level not only implies less influence of moral principles on behavior, but actually 
implies a negative view of such principles.  
 This latter proposition is supported by several different streams of literature. First, low 
construal level involves a shorter time-horizon than high construal level (Liberman & Trope, 
2007): low construal level therefore implies a preference for what is feasible now, rather than 
what is desirable in the long run (Trope & Liberman, 1998). In line with this, it has been 
suggested that moral norms and principles ‘fade’ from one’s decision frame when one focuses on 
the ‘here’ and ‘now’ (such as in low construal; Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & 
Bazerman, 2010; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Low construal level has been shown to increase 
the influence of ‘want’ over ‘should’ (Trope & Liberman, 2000). Moral norms stand in the way 
of at least some things we might want, and may prohibit at least some things that are feasible in 
the short run. Low construal level therefore makes moral norms feel more like restrictions. Last, 
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and most importantly, in addition to construal level fit there is also ‘construal level misfit’ 
(Berson & Halevy, 2014): people derive negative value when the abstractness of information 
does not fit their construal level mindset. For example, Berson et al. (2014) show that abstract, 
visionary communication is experienced as less motivating, or even demotivating, by those in 
low construal level mindsets. 
 Taken together, this all leads us to conclude that leaders in low construal level mindsets 
have a negative view of moral norms in general and their obligation to enact discipline in 
response to moral transgressions in particular. Because of this, we argue that they may actively 
avoid enacting discipline in response to moral transgressions. In contrast, high construal level 
leaders are mainly motivated by a sense of moral obligation (Eyal et al., 2009); we therefore 
argue that they enact stronger discipline in response to moral follower transgressions.  
This argument results in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: A high construal level mindset makes leaders respond with discipline to 
followers’ moral transgressions. 
Hypothesis 2: A low construal level mindset makes leaders actively avoid discipline in 
response to followers’ moral transgressions. 
Integration of arguments and overview of studies 
To test these two unique predictions regarding the role of construal level in motivating 
leaders to use discipline –versus avoid using it –we compared leaders’ disciplinary responses to 
moral transgressions with their responses to transgressions that are not considered moral. To do 
so, we compared disciplinary responses to intentional versus unintentional follower 
transgressions. Only intentional transgressions are viewed as moral transgressions (Malle & 
Nelson, 2003) whereas unintentional transgressions are usually discounted as simple mishaps 
(Knobe, 2003). Our arguments above should therefore only apply to intentional transgressions.  
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Low construal level leaders do not avoid disciplining unintentional transgressions. Such 
transgressions provide information about follower performance: an unintentionally transgressing 
follower shows he or she is unaware of the rules of the workplace, or indicates a lack of vigilance 
in upholding these rules (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). Nor do we expect high construal 
level leaders to neglect unintentional transgressing followers. After all, caring about morality 
does not stop one from also caring about performance. We, therefore, do not expect low and high 
construal level leaders to respond differently to unintentional misbehavior. We do, however, 
expect them to respond differently to intentional follower misbehavior: high construal level 
leaders are more likely to discipline followers after intentional misbehavior, low construal level 
leaders are less likely to do so. 
The same kind of behavior can be displayed both intentionally as well as unintentionally 
(Leunissen, De Cremer, Reinders Folmer, & Van Dijke, 2013; Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, & 
Uchiyama, 2008). This allows us to manipulate in our experimental studies whether or not a 
follower transgressed morally or not by manipulating the intentionality of the transgression. In 
this paper, unintentional follower transgressions function as a baseline case: We use unintentional 
transgressions to determine whether construal level makes a leader less or more inclined to enact 
disciplinary measures in response to follower moral transgressions. 
We tested our argument in three studies. In Studies 1 and 2, both laboratory experiments, 
we assigned participants to a mid-level management position in a simulated company. In both 
studies, we used in-basket exercises, a popular tool to assess managerial behavior (e.g., Meyer, 
1970; Whetzel, Rotenbury, & McDaniel, 2014) and asked the leader to respond to employee 
misconduct (see Hoogervorst, De Cremer, & Van Dijke, 2010 for a similar procedure). We 
manipulated the intentionality of the transgression (Leunissen et al., 2013; Struthers et al., 2008) 
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and construal level of the leader (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004; McCrea, Wieber, & Myers, 
2012) using existing procedures.  
Study 3 was a field study among organizational leaders. To increase methodological 
diversity, we measured chronic individual differences in construal level (Vallacher, & Wegner, 
1989). We asked the leaders to recall and describe an instance of intentional versus unintentional 
employee misconduct (see Leunissen et al., 2013 for a similar procedure) and asked them about 
their disciplinary actions in the described situation.   
Study 1 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and twenty-six undergraduate students, Mage = 21.00; SDage = 
2.04; 45 women (35.7 %), participated in return for partial course credit. They were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (transgression type: intentional vs. unintentional) X 2 (construal level: high vs. 
low) between-subjects factorial design. 
Procedure. We used an in-basket exercise. In-basket exercises are popular ways to assess 
job performance (Whetzel et al., 2014) and have been used extensively in leadership experiments 
(Hoogervorst et al., 2010). We told participants that they would be involved in testing a new 
assessment tool stimulating an actual work environment. More specifically, participants were 
assigned to a mid-level management position in a company comprising four people: the CEO, a 
middle level manager (the participant), and two employees (responsible to the participant; see 
Figure 1). Participants were informed that they would receive messages from other participants 
and that their task was to respond to these messages. In reality, all messages from both CEO and 
subordinates were pre-programmed. Hence, we did not use any human confederates in this study.  
We further informed participants that they would be working on developing a slogan for a 
new marketing campaign with their subordinates, and if the campaign was successful, they could 
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earn up to €10 (approximately $14 at the time of the study). Subordinates were supposed to share 
any work they did with their supervisor (the participant). However, subordinates could also 
submit work to the experimenter directly, in which case the team and the participant would not 
get a share of the potential bonus. This created the possibility for the subordinate to transgress a 
moral norm. We emphasized that it was the participant’s task, as a mid-level manager, to evaluate 
the quality of the subordinates’ work.  
----------------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ----------------------------------- 
While participants were waiting for the first message from their subordinates, we asked 
them to engage in a short exercise. This exercise actually constituted the construal level 
manipulation, which was presented to participants as a “mind focusing exercise”. We used a 
procedure developed by Lin, Murphy, and Shoben (1997) to prime construal level mindset. 
Participants were presented with four sets of objects, which were held constant across conditions. 
One of the sets, for instance, consisted of a T-shirt, a high-heel shoe, a sandal, and a pair of jeans; 
another consisted of a Dalmatian (i.e., a breed of dogs), a goldfish, a German shepherd dog, and a 
hawk. Participants in the high construal level condition were asked to generate functions, uses, 
materials, and physical characteristics that were common to all four objects in each set. 
Participants in the low construal level condition were asked to name functions, uses, materials, 
and physical characteristics that were different to all four objects in each set. Focusing on 
communalities induces a focus on overarching categories, and thus a high construal level 
mindset. A focus on differences induces a focus on lower level categories, and hence a low 
construal level mindset (Lin et al., 1997). 
Immediately after completion of this procedure, participants received a message from one 
of their subordinates telling them that they had submitted their work themselves and had received 
€ 7.50 (approx. $ 10.50 at the time of the study). In the intentional transgression condition, the 
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employee stated that he or she had done so because (s)he did not want to share the proceeds, and 
had thus deliberately chosen to bypass the participant. In the unintentional transgression 
condition, the employee stated that (s)he had intended to send the work to the participant, but had 
accidently pressed the wrong key. In both cases, we made sure the participants understood that 
their subordinate had, in fact, received money and that they would not be able to recover it (see 
e.g., Kim, et al., 2004; Struthers et al., 2008, for similar procedures). 
At the end of the study, we informed participants that their team had received another 
bonus, which was to be shared among the team members at the participants’ discretion. We 
emphasized that the team had received this extra bonus based on the quality of their group work. 
Thus, our participants had at least partly benefitted from their subordinate’s misbehavior.  The 
participants were not given the full bonus, thus implying that they could have received an even 
higher bonus if the transgressing subordinate had not misbehaved. 
We then asked participants to indicate whether they would share part of this bonus with 
the transgressing employee. Whether they decided to do so or not constituted our first dependent 
variable. Secondly, if they chose to share, we asked how much of the bonus they would allocate 
to their transgressing subordinate. This constituted our second dependent variable.  
Finally, we debriefed the participants and thanked them for their participation. None of 
the participants objected to the procedures used.  
Manipulation checks. Because the Lin et al. (1997) construal level manipulation has so 
far been used in a limited number of studies only (we know of only two: Fujita & Roberts, 2010; 
Smith & Trope, 2006), we followed the procedures set out by Fujita and Roberts (2010) to check 
for the effectiveness of this construal level induction. Specifically, we used a modified version of 
the Behavioral Identification Form (‘BIF’; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) as manipulation check. 
For each of ten different activities, participants were asked to indicate on a seven-point Likert 
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scale which of two possible descriptions they preferred for a given activity (e.g., “cleaning the 
house”). One description referred to a (concrete, low level) means to describe the activity (e.g., 
“vacuum cleaning the floor”). The other description indicated the (abstract, high level) 
superordinate goal of the activity (e.g., “showing one’s cleanliness”). We collapsed these ten 
items into a scale (Cronbach’s α = .77).  
We assessed the success of the transgression-type manipulation with two forced choice 
questions (yes or no): (1) ‘Do you think your subordinate did this intentionally?’, and (2) ‘Do you 
think your subordinate intended to follow proper procedure?’ (see Ohbuchi & Sato, 1994, for a 
similar procedure).  
Results 
 Manipulation checks. ANOVA with construal level and transgression type as 
independent variables and the BIF as dependent variable revealed a main effect of construal level, 
F(1, 122) = 4.84, p = .03, η2 = .04. Participants in the high construal level condition were more 
likely to prefer the high level, more abstract descriptions of the given activities, M = 5.37, SD 
= .98, relative to participants in the low construal level mindset condition, M = 4.92, SD = 1.21. 
There was no significant main effect of transgression type, F < 1, p = .69, nor did we find a 
significant construal level x transgression type interaction effect, F = 1.39, p = .24. This indicates 
that the construal level priming procedure was successful.  
 We used logistic regression to analyze the two binary manipulation checks for the 
transgression type manipulation. We included both experimental conditions as well as the 
interaction between the two as independent variables in our model. The full model for the 
question whether participants believed their employee’s transgression was intentional was 
statistically significant, χ2(2, N = 126) = 57.24, p < 0.001. This model revealed a significant main 
effect for transgression type, B = -2.97, SE = .68, Wald(1) = 19.38, p < 0.001, Odds ratio = .05, 
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95% CI for Odds Ration [.01,.19], but no significant effects for construal level, B = .12, p = .84, 
or the interaction term, B = -.41, p = .68. In the intentional transgression condition, 88.1% of 
participants agreed that their employee had transgressed intentionally; in the unintentional 
condition, only 23.9% did so. 
The full model was also significant for the second manipulation check, assessing whether 
participants believed the employee had intended to follow proper procedures χ2(2, N = 126) = 
48.69, p < 0.001. As before, we found a significant main effect for transgression type, B = -2.52, 
SE = .65, Wald(1) = 14.58, p < 0.001, Odds ratio: .08, 95% CI for Odds Ration [.02, .29], but no 
significant effects for construal level, B = -.09, p = .87, or the interaction term, B = -.11, p = .91. 
In the intentional transgression condition, 89.8% of participants thought the employee had 
intentionally not followed proper procedures; in the unintentional transgression condition, only 
31.3% of participants thought so. Taken together, these analyses indicate that the manipulation of 
transgression type was successful. 
 Hypotheses tests. We tested our hypotheses in two ways: first we wanted to see whether 
the participants decided to share part of the bonus with the transgressing follower. Second, we 
wanted to test how much they shared if they had decided to do so. We were interested in both 
these questions as both withholding a bonus and sharing relatively little (i.e. withholding part, not 
all, of the bonus) is a form of discipline. 
Our first dependent variable was whether our participants chose to share part of the team 
bonus with their transgressing employee. In total, 62 out of 119 participants indicated they would 
do so. Seven observations had missing data and were deleted. To test our hypotheses, we used 
logistic regression with the main effects of the experimental manipulations and the interaction 
between the two manipulations as predictors. The full model was statistically significant, χ2(3, N 
= 119) = 7.85, p = .045. Furthermore, the difference in χ2 values between the model with and the 
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model without interaction term was itself significant (p = .04), which indicates a significant 
omnibus interaction effect (Jaccard, 2001).  
The analysis revealed a significant interaction between construal level and transgression 
type, B = 2.05, SE = .79, Wald(1) = 6.82, p = .01, Odds ratio: 7.77, 95% CI for Odds Ratio: 
[1.67, 36.24]. Figure 2 depicts this effect. In line with Hypothesis 1, in the high construal level 
condition, more participants shared their bonus with employees who had transgressed 
unintentionally (57.6 %) than with those who had transgressed intentionally (32.1 %); Odds 
ratio: .47, 95 % CI for Odds Ratio: [.16, 1.38]. Conversely, and in support of Hypothesis 2, in the 
low construal level condition, fewer participants shared their bonus with employees who had 
transgressed unintentionally (44.1 %) than with those who had transgressed intentionally 
(55.9 %), Odds ratio: 2.86, 95 % CI for Odds Ratio: [1.00, 8.20].  We did not find significant 
main effects for either construal level (p = .55), or for intentionality (p = .17).  
--------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here---------------------------------- 
Subsequently, we tested whether the interaction pattern that we found above would also 
emerge for the amount of money (in cents) that leaders shared with their transgressing 
subordinate (if they decided to share). In other words, we expected leaders with a high construal 
level mindset to share less money with their subordinate after an intentional transgression than 
after an unintentional one, and expected the reverse to be true for leaders with a low construal 
level mindset. This variable is characterized by a truncated distribution (i.e., a distribution 
clustered on a limiting value, in this case zero; McDonald & Moffit, 1980). Hence, we used tobit 
regression analysis to analyze this data (Tobin, 1958). Tobit regression uses all the observations 
of a truncated distributed dataset to estimate a regression line, rather than just the observation 
with a value above the limiting value, and is therefore preferred when analyzing truncated 
distributed dependent variables over other techniques that use only the values above (or below) 
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the limiting value (such as traditional OLS-regression analyses of truncated distributions; Baba, 
1990; Leigh, 1985). 
 This analysis revealed a significant main effect of transgression type, β= - 123.36, SE = 
50.81, p = .02, such that less money was shared with the transgressing subordinate after an 
intentional, rather than after an unintentional transgression. This main effect of transgression type 
was qualified by a significant interaction between construal level and transgression type, β = 
188.05, SE = 68.34, p < .001. Figure 3 visually depicts this interaction effect. On average, 
participants in the high construal level condition shared more money with a subordinate who had 
transgressed unintentionally, M = 94.97, SD = 92.71, than with a subordinate who had 
transgressed intentionally, M = 44.23, SD = 82.85, though these differences were not statistically 
significant, F(1, 116) = 2.01, p = .15. In contrast, participants in the low level condition shared, 
on average, significantly more money with their subordinate who had  transgressed intentionally, 
M = 113.83, SD = 109.46, rather than unintentionally, M = 74.19, SD = 92.08, F(1, 116) = 
5.96, p = .01. All means reported here are in Eurocents. 
--------------------------------Insert Figure 3 around here-------------------------------- 
Discussion 
In sum, participants in the leader role were more likely to enact disciplinary measures in 
response to intentional, rather than unintentional subordinate transgressions after having 
completed a high construal level induction procedure. When participants completed a low 
construal level induction procedure, we found the opposite effect: participants were less likely to 
enact disciplinary measures in response to intentional, rather than unintentional, subordinate 
transgressions. Thus, high construal level may, facilitates the expression of moral obligations and 
norms in leader disciplinary behavior. Low construal level has the opposite effect: these leaders 
avoid enacting discipline in response to moral follower transgressions. 
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In Study 1, we focused on employee misconduct that partly benefitted the leader. Yet, we 
argued that the increased motivation to discipline moral transgressions among high construal 
level leaders and the motivation to avoid discipline among low construal level leaders should 
extend to moral transgressions that do not benefit the leader or the organization. Study 2 is 
therefore essentially a replication of Study 1. Yet, this time we ensured that participants did not 
benefit at all from their subordinate’s misbehavior.  
Study 2 
Method 
 Participants and design. One hundred and seventeen undergraduate students (Mage = 
20.82, SD = 1.83; 41 women) participated in this study for partial fulfillment of course credit. 
They were randomly assigned to a 2 (transgression type; intentional vs. unintentional 
transgression) X 2 (construal level; high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design. 
Procedure. We used the same procedures as in Study 1. We again used an in-basket 
exercise in which the participants were assigned to a mid-level management role. However, we 
used a different procedure to induce construal level mindsets. We used the well-validated 
“why/how” priming procedure developed by Freitas and colleagues (2004). Participants were 
invited to ponder either “why-questions” (to induce a focus on higher order goals of action, i.e., a 
high construal level mindset) or “how-questions” (to induce a focus on the subordinate means by 
which actions are accomplished, i.e., a low construal level mindset) with regard to a certain 
activity (e.g., “Why/how do you want to maintain and improve your health?”). This procedure 
was repeated eight times in each condition, once with “maintain and improve your health” as 
target, and once with dress well’ as target. For example, if a participant in the high construal level 
condition answered the question “Why do you want to dress nicely?” with an answer such as “to 
look good”, they would be prompted to consider “Why do you want to look good?” In contrast, a 
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participant who answered the question “How do you want to dress nicely?” might answer “by 
wearing matching clothes”. He or she would then be prompted with the question “How would 
you go about to wear matching clothes?” 
This procedure has been shown to consistently induce high or low construal level 
mindsets in a large number of studies (e.g., Fujita & Roberts, 2010; McCrea et al., 2012; Torelli 
& Kaikati, 2009). This is, if people are prompted to consider more abstract information (i.e., 
superordinate goals) or more concrete information (i.e., subordinate means), the mindset carries 
over to subsequent tasks (Malkoc, Zauberman, & Bettman, 2010). 
We manipulated transgression type in the same manner as in Study 1: participants 
received a message explaining that one of their employees had either intentionally or 
unintentionally received money that should have been shared by the team. We specifically stated 
that they would not get the money back from the transgressing follower, and that the team would 
not receive a bonus. 
Directly after this, we assessed the dependent variable and after that our manipulation 
checks (to prevent contamination). Finally, participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. None of the participants objected to the procedures used. 
Manipulation checks. To test whether the manipulation of intentionality was successful 
we asked participants to indicate to what extent they thought the transgressing employee (1) had 
acted in bad faith, (2) had behaved in this way because of a misunderstanding (reverse coded) and 
(3) had put his or her self-interest above that of the team (all three items measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale; 1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). These three items were collapsed into one reliable 
perceived intentional versus unintentional transgression scale (Cronbach’s α = .75), with higher 
scores indicating more perceived intentionality (see Fragale, Rosen, Xu, & Merideth, 2009, for a 
similar procedure). 
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Because the Freitas et al. (2004) construal level induction procedure has been extensively 
validated in prior work, we decided not to include a manipulation check for the construal level 
manipulation. The only available check for construal level manipulations is the BIF (Fujita & 
Roberts, 2010; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), which we also included in Study 1. We were afraid 
that including the BIF as a check of the Freitas construal level manipulation might lead to 
hypothesis guessing due to the overlap between the manipulation instructions and the items of the 
BIF. 
 Dependent variable. As dependent variable we asked participants to indicate whether 
they were willing to report the behavior of the transgressing employee to the CEO (i.e., their own 
boss; 1 = not at all; 7 = very much so).  
Results 
Manipulation check. ANOVA with construal level mindset and transgression type as 
independent variables and our three-item manipulation check-scale revealed a significant main 
effect for transgression type, F(1,113) = 6.85, p < .01. Participants in the intentional transgression 
condition were significantly more likely to indicate that the transgression had been committed 
intentionally, M = 4.54, SD = .75, than participants in the unintentional transgression condition, 
M = 4.15, SD = .87. There was no main effect of construal level, p = .25, nor did we find an 
interaction between the two factors, p = .26. This indicates that our manipulation was successful. 
Hypotheses test. ANOVA with construal level and transgression type as independent 
variables and willingness to report the transgressing employee to the CEO as dependent variable 
revealed the expected construal level by transgression type interaction, F (1,113) = 9.12, p < .01, 
η2 =.08. Figure 4 visually represents the interaction. In line with Hypothesis 1, subsequent simple 
effects analyses revealed that high construal level leaders were more likely to report the 
transgressing employee after an intentional, M = 5.00, SD = 1.59 than after an unintentional 
GETTING IT DONE RIGHT  19 
 
transgression, M = 4.09, SD = 1.76, F(1,113) = 4.27, p = .04, η2=.04. In contrast, and in line with 
Hypothesis 2, low construal level leaders were more likely to report the transgressing employee 
after an unintentional transgression, M = 4.34, SD = 1.63 than after an intentional transgression, 
M = 3.39, SD = 1.59, F(1, 113) = 4.93, p = .03, η2 = .04. We did not find a significant main effect 
for transgression type, F < 1, p >.95. We did, however, find a significant main effect for construal 
level, F(1,113) = 4.80, p = .03, η2=.04, such that high construal level leaders were, in general, 
more likely to report the transgressing employee to the CEO, M = 4.52, SD = 1.75, than low 
construal level leaders, M = 3.92, SD = 1.67.  
-----------------------------------Insert Figure 4 about here ----------------------------------- 
Discussion 
In Study 2, we again found a stronger willingness to enact disciplinary measures in 
response to intentional (rather than unintentional) subordinate transgressions when participants 
were brought into a high construal level mindset. In contrast, when participants were brought into 
low construal level mindsets, intentional transgressions were met with less discipline than 
unintentional transgressions. Moral rules are viewed as guidelines under high construal level, but 
perceived as frustrating impediments under low construal level. This causes that low construal 
level leaders actively aim to avoid discipline in response to transgressions of moral norms.  
Study 3 
We conducted Study 3 with two major aims in mind. First, wanted to provide empirical 
evidence that our results generalize to leaders’ responses to employees’ violations of moral norms 
in real work organizations. Second, we wanted to provide a stringent test of our argument across 
our studies, using several different operationalization of construal level. We therefore focused on 
individual differences in construal level mindset rather than priming it. Theoretically, individual 
differences in construal level have similar effects compared to situationally induced levels of 
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construal (Trope, & Liberman, 2010; Vallacher, & Wegner, 1989). In this study we set out to test 
that. 
Method 
Design. The design involved an assessment of construal level (as a continuous 
independent variable) and an experimental recall manipulation of transgression type (intentional 
vs. unintentional). 
Respondents. We used Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to recruit our respondents. 
AMT is an online community designed to bring providers of relatively small tasks in contact with 
workers willing to execute them. We invited one hundred and twenty participants, seven of which 
failed an attention check at the beginning of the study, and were subsequently removed from the 
study (see Oppenheimer, Mayvis, & Davidenko, 2009 for this procedure). We therefore included 
113 respondents in the main study. Using AMT as a source for reliable data from a non-student 
population (Buhrmeister, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) has recently been gained popularity among 
organizational researchers (e.g., Cryder, Loewenstein, & Scheines, 2013; Uhlmann, Heaphy, 
Ashford, Zhu, & Sanchez-Burks, 2013). AMT is also an effective way to recruit organizational 
leaders (Van Houwelingen et al., 2014). 
Of the 113 respondents, 40 were female (35.4%); the average age was 32.81 years (SD = 
9.14) respondents. All respondents held paid employment at the time of the study and held at 
least a middle or lower level management position in their respective organizations (i.e., they 
supervised at least one other employee). On average, participants supervised 23.19 employees 
(SD = 92.04). Eighty-three (37.5 %) respondents held a graduate degree; 35 (31 %) held a post-
graduate degree (PhD, MBA or equivalent); 25 (22.1%) had completed undergraduate education 
only, and five respondents (4.4 %) had a high school degree only. On average, respondents had 
9.6 years of experience working in jobs of at least 12 hours per week (SD = 8.44) and worked, on 
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average, 42.9 hours per week (SD = 10.10). Respondents indicated to have been working at their 
organizations for an average of 5.53 years (SD = 4.40) and had held their job for an average of 
4.20 years (SD = 3.11). Respondents were paid $ 0.85 for their participation in the study. 
 Procedure. Following procedures used by Leunissen et al. (2013), we asked half of our 
respondents to recall a situation in which a subordinate “unintentionally did something you felt 
was wrong or unjust”. The other half were asked to recall a situation in which a subordinate 
“intentionally did something you felt was wrong or unjust”. In both conditions, we asked 
respondents to recall the event “as vividly as possible” and they were prompted to consider the 
following questions: “What happened exactly? What did [your subordinate] say or do? What did 
you say or do? How did it make you feel?” Allocation to either one of these conditions was on a 
random basis. Twelve respondents failed to describe a situation, and ten others either wrote about 
an intentional transgression in the unintentional condition or vice versa. These respondents were 
removed from the dataset, leaving a final N of 91. There were no significant differences between 
the removed respondents and the others on any of the demographic variables. 
 Control variable. To alleviate concerns that recalled intentional transgressions are more 
severe than unintentional transgressions, we measured transgression severity using an item from 
Leunissen et al. (2013). We asked respondents to indicate “To what extent did you feel that you 
were harmed by your subordinate?” 
 Measures. We used a subscale from Dobbins’ (1985) validated corrective actions scale to 
measure leader discipline. This scale consists of twelve items describing possible actions 
available to a leader after a follower transgression, divided over four subscales. Respondents are 
asked to indicate to what extent they find a given action appropriate. We used the punishment 
subscale (three items: “terminate contract”, “provide written reprimand”, “decrease pay”; 
Cronbach’s α = .64) since this was closest to our purposes (the other subscales describe offering 
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support and sympathy, training and monitoring). This Cronbach α coefficient is quite similar to 
those found in previous studies (e.g., Dedrick & Dobbins, 1991; Dobbins, 1985). 
We measured dispositional construal level with the BIF developed by Vallacher and 
Wegner (1989). This is by far the most often used scale to measure dispositional construal level 
(Hart & Burton, 2013; Freitas et al., 2001; Fujita & Roberts, 2010). It consists of 25 descriptions 
of actions at an intermediate level of abstraction (e.g., locking the door, picking an apple). 
Respondents are asked to indicate which of two re-descriptions, one relatively concrete (e.g., 
putting the key in the lock, pulling an apple from the branch), the other relatively abstract (e.g., 
securing the house, getting something to eat) they find more fitting. Higher scores on this scale 
represent a relative preference for abstraction and lower scores a preference for concreteness. 
Results 
Transgression severity. Regression of transgression severity item on the BIF, the 
intentionality manipulation and the interaction between the latter two revealed no significant 
interaction effect, β = .03, SE = .11, t(90) = .26, p = .79. Nor did we find a significant main 
effects for intentionality, β = -.40, SE = 2.01, t(90) = 0.20, p = .84, or for the BIF, β = -.06, SE 
= .07, t(90) = 0.96, p = .34 and therefore concluded there was no reason to believe that 
transgression severity was influenced by our manipulation or measurement of the BIF. 
Hypotheses tests. Regression of the punishment subscale on the BIF, the intentionality 
manipulation, and the interaction between those two variables revealed a significant interaction 
effect, β = -.13, SE = .06, t(90) = -2.16, p = .03. We did not find a significant main effect of the 
BIF, β = .03, SE = .04, t = 0.94, p = .35, or a significant main effect of intentionality, β = 1.99, SE 
= 1.09, t = 1.84, p = .07. Figure 5 depicts the interaction. We used a technique developed by 
Johnson and Neyman (1936) to further probe this interaction. The advantage of this technique 
compared to – for example – simple slope analyses, is that it does not require defining arbitrary 
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moderator values as “high” or “low”. Instead, it identifies the regions of moderator values (BIF 
values in this case) for which the effect of the independent variable (here: intentionality) is 
significant, and in which specific direction. We found a significant negative, p < .05 (one-sided), 
effect of intentionality on punishment for BIF values of 5.96 and lower. This indicates, in line 
with Hypothesis 2, that leaders scoring relatively low on the BIF were less likely to punish 
intentional than unintentional transgressors. In contrast, we found significant positive relations 
between intentionality and punishment, p <.05 (one-sided), for BIF values above 19.68. This 
indicates, in line with Hypothesis 2, that leaders who scored relatively high on the BIF were more 
likely to punish intentional than unintentional transgressions. We report one-sided tests here, as 
we deal with directional hypotheses. 
---------------------------------Insert Figure 5 about here-------------------------------- 
General Discussion 
Enacting disciplinary measures is often the ‘right thing’ to do (Ciulla, 1995), but it can 
also be unpleasant and distracting (Treviño, 1992). Our research showed that whether leaders are 
inclined to deliver discipline in response to moral transgressions depends much on how they 
view, or construe, moral norms: either as guidelines for behavior, or as annoying obstacles. The 
former is associated with high level construal, whereas the latter is associated with low construal 
level. Accordingly, high construal level makes leaders more likely to enact discipline in response 
to follower moral misbehavior. In contrast, low construal level makes leader actively avoid doing 
so. In fact, these leaders enact stronger discipline in response to amoral (i.e., unintentional) 
follower transgressions (compared to intentional follower transgressions).   
In all three studies, we used different operationalizations of construal level and studied 
different ways of enacting disciplinary measures. Specifically, we used two different procedures 
to induce construal level in Studies 1 and 2, respectively. In Study 3, we measured dispositional 
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construal level. In Study 1, we gave participants the opportunity to withhold a bonus. In Study 2, 
participants could report their transgressing subordinate. In Study 3, we measured the willingness 
to enact several different disciplinary measures. We also used two different research designs: 
Studies 1 and 2 were experimental laboratory studies for which we recruited business students. In 
Study 3, we recruited leaders in organizations and employed a quasi-experimental design. Taken 
together, the results of these studies show support that our predictions hold across different 
contexts and research designs. 
Theoretical implications  
 Leaders’ low construal level mindsets prevents them from enacting discipline when 
followers transgress a moral norm. Previous studies have shown that when a follower 
transgresses in a way that benefits the leader or the organization, a leader is less inclined to enact 
disciplinary measures (Hoogervorst et al., 2010; Sims & Brinkmann, 2003). However, our results 
show that even when a leader does not benefit personally from a follower’s transgression, he or 
she may neglect to enact disciplinary measures. In this sense, we move beyond a simple 
dichotomy between self-interest and morality (Hunt et al., 2010). Leadership researchers should 
recognize that a fundamental cognitive phenomenon such as construal level may cause leaders to 
fail to uphold their moral duties. 
The failure to enact disciplinary measures in response to follower moral transgressions 
sits uneasily with virtually all normative leadership theories (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Ciulla, 
2004). Indeed, it has been argued that morally justified action is at the very core of leadership 
(Ciulla, 1995). From this perspective, the negative view of moral norms and principles that is 
associated with lower construal levels directly impairs the ability to lead (Kalshoven, Den 
Hartog, & De Hoogh, 2013). After all, in many cases, responding to follower immoral conduct 
with at least some form of disciplinary action is the morally mandated course of action (Gini, 
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1997). Our work therefore indicates that leader low construal level is associated with lower levels 
of ethical leadership (at least with the disciplinary aspects of ethical leadership).  
Our research has also clear implications for the literature on leader discipline. Most extant 
research on leader discipline has focused on the consequences of leader discipline (Ball, Treviño, 
& Sims, 1992) for follower performance (Podsakoff, Bommer, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006). 
With the research reported here, we extend this literature in two ways. First, we focus on 
antecedents of leader discipline. Secondly, we also go beyond the exclusive focus on 
performance and focus on moral behaviors instead. Given the important moral and practical 
consequences from failing to enact discipline in response moral misbehavior it is imperative that 
researcher start focusing more on this topic. However, we believe that our framework can be 
extended towards the broader domain of leader responses to follower behavior as well (e.g. 
reward). Essentially, construal level theory is a theory about information processing and mental 
representation. As long as a leader needs to process and respond to information about a follower, 
construal level theory is potentially relevant.  
In fact, construal level theory proven to be an important and versatile theoretical 
perspective in the intrapersonal and cognitive domains (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Several 
scholars have already called for further application of this theory to better understand leader 
cognition (e.g., Popper, 2013 Tumasjan, Strobel, & Welpe, 2008). This call has barely been 
answered (see Berson et al., 2014 for a recent and notable exception). Construal level is an 
important phenomenon to study interpersonal processes in general, and leadership specifically, as 
it directly affects how we understand and respond to relevant information about another person or 
a situation (Hanges, Lord, & Dickson, 2000). In our case, for instance, we have shown that 
construal level affects the way we construe moral norms and thus how we apply such norms in 
our daily working life. This provides a way for researchers to extend construal level theory to the 
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uncharted terrain of leadership specifically, and interpersonal interaction in general (Burgoon et 
al., 2013). 
Furthermore, scholars have often presumed that people hold a positive view of moral 
norms and obligations (Haidt, 2008; Rai & Fiske, 2011). Even those that transgress moral norms 
have been presumed to want to uphold them, but to be lacking in self-control (Balliet & 
Joireman, 2010), moral awareness (Butterfield, Treviño, & Weaver, 2000), or to have been 
influenced by certain unconscious affective factors (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001). Our work 
provides an alternative possibility: people may also have an adverse attitude towards moral norms 
– they may regard them to be restrictive of their freedom and annoying impediments to gain what 
they want. Of course, having a positive view of moral rules and norms is not the only reason to 
comply with them; people also may comply because they fear sanctions (Posner & Rasmussen, 
1999), or fear being rejected from their social grouping (Wenegrat, Abrams, Castillo-Yee, & 
Romine, 1996). However, our work shows that a negative view of moral norms at least has 
substantial influence on people’s willingness to enforce them. The consequences are likely to 
stretch far beyond the domain of leader discipline. It would be interesting to see, for instance, 
how these effects shape up for different populations charged with enforcing norms, such as police 
agents or school teachers.  
Lastly, one of our anonymous reviewers provided us with the intriguing suggestion that a 
negative view of moral norms may also stem from a certain discomfort with morality. People 
may, for instance, feel uncomfortable with the need to judge others – for instance stemming from 
a desire to be liked. We do not believe such effects have been at play in our studies, since – for 
instance – as far as we know construal level does not influence need to belong or any related 
constructs. However, it seems clear that the assumption that all people at all-time have a positive 
attitude towards morality needs qualifying. 
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Practical implications 
Leaders are important moral actors within the organization: their actions directly 
influence the firm’s ethical climate (Mulki, Jaramillo, & Locander, 2009) more so than regular 
employees and they are moral role models for many of their subordinates (Brown & Treviño, 
2006). Leaders failing to uphold their moral obligations, therefore, pose an important problem 
from an organizational and societal perspective, especially when this moral obligation is to 
enforce moral norms in the wake of follower misconduct. Our research shows that this problem is 
even bigger than previously thought: leaders sometimes actively avoid doing their moral duty of 
enacting discipline. This failure is problematic from a normative (Ciulla, 2004) and a practical 
standpoint – third party follower reactions to leaders that fail to enact sufficient discipline are 
decidedly negative (Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010). The reason for this is that leaders construe moral 
norms on a low level, and therefore hold an adverse attitude towards them. It is imperative 
therefore organizations ensure that leaders see moral norms not as annoyances but as guidelines. 
The effect-sizes we found for our tests, particularly those for hypothesis 2 (η2 = .04 in 
Study 2, R2 = XX in Study 3) ranged from medium to small by conventional standards (Cohen, 
1992). As is well known, effect sizes may vary substantially from study to study (Aguinis, Beaty, 
Boik, & Pierce, 2005). In addition, recent research shows that Cohen’s (1992) rules of the thumb 
as regard to “small”, “medium” and “large” effect size may almost certainly be too strict: effect 
sizes actually reported in empirical research tend to be smaller than Cohen (1992) may have 
envisioned (Bosco, Aguinis, Singh, Field, & Pierce, 2014). Given the fact that we consistently 
found comparable results in three different studies, using varying operationalizations of construal 
level and leader disciplinary behavior strengthens our confidence that the totality of evidence 
supports our claims. 
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A positive view of moral norms comes with high construal level, a negative view with 
low construal level. The literature has identified many practically relevant antecedents of 
construal level (Burgoon et al., 2013). The most important of these is undoubtedly distance: 
events and objects close by (in space and/or time, among other things) are generally represented 
at lower levels of construal (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Our results therefore point to the perils of 
setting short-term targets for lower and middle-level management (Johnson, Garrison, Hernez-
Broome, Fleenor, & Steed, 2012). Short-term targets are likely to engender a short-term focus 
(and therefore a low construal level mindset) among lower and middle managers. These 
managers are then, by consequence, unlikely to enact disciplinary measures when these are 
needed most: when followers transgress moral norms intentionally. Hence, to promote the 
enactment of discipline when it is needed, organizations should allow leaders the relative ‘luxury’ 
of being able to disengage from the immediate context.  
Limitations and suggestions for further research  
Studying leadership processes in lab settings, as we did in this paper, is still somewhat 
unusual. At first sight, this is understandable: leadership takes place within the complex social 
arenas that are modern day’s organizations; a context that is impossible to emulate in the lab. Yet, 
lab research has been gaining traction due to its unique ability to study important processes in 
isolation and to provide evidence of causality (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002; 
Hoogervorst et al., 2010). For the relatively intricate topic under investigation here, we felt 
experimental data provided some distinctive advantages over more traditional survey data. One of 
these advantages is high internal validity of experimental data (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). 
Nonetheless, we do recognize that high external and ecological validity are just as important for 
leadership research (Locke, 1986). We therefore designed our experimental studies to provide a 
realistic simulation of actual working relationships and a realistic simulation of an engaging job 
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simulation task (Whetzel, et al., 2014). We also replicated our findings in a field setting using 
organizational leaders in Study 3. The consistent results across lab (Study 1 and 2) and field 
studies (Study 3) increase our confidence in the robustness of our results. Nonetheless, more 
(field) research may be needed to fully establish the ecological validity of our findings.  
A further suggestion for further research is related to the moral consequences of construal 
level. Our results and arguments illustrate how construal level has meaningful consequences for 
the way leaders understand follower behavior and, by consequence, the choices they make 
regarding their followers. Under high construal level, moral principles have a stronger influence 
on leader disciplinary behavior. Our research shows that this makes them more likely to enact 
discipline if a follower transgresses. On the other hand, it may also make them relatively 
draconian in the sense that they are likely to disregard extenuating details. Low construal level, in 
contrast, makes leaders more likely to take a pragmatic view of follower behavior. This may have 
undesirable consequences in terms of low construal level enacting little discipline in response to 
followers morally transgressing, but also makes them more susceptible to consider mitigating 
circumstances. There are therefore certainly boundary conditions to the effect we uncovered. We 
leave it to future research to explore these further.   
Concluding remarks 
 It is comforting to assume that leaders will want to act upon moral rules under all 
circumstances, and that any failure to do so is caused by inattentiveness or mistakes. Not so. 
Leaders (in low construal level mindsets) may also have a decidedly adverse attitude towards 
moral norms and may be unwilling to enforce them. Effective enforcement of moral rules by 
organizational leaders therefore requires the ability to construe matters on a higher level. 
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